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Unlike the commonplace statement that defamation law protects reputation, this article
suggests that it only protects aspects of reputation. Previously, defamation was often the
only avenue of legal protection for reputation worth examining, but now privacy actions
also offer an avenue of protection for aspects of reputation in many jurisdictions. In other
words, informational privacy law now protects aspects of reputation, as does defamation
law. Recognizing this fact leads to the suggestion that exactly what each action—defamation
and informational privacy—seeks to protect could be stated more concisely. This exercise,
undertaken in this article, draws on classic defamation law analysis by Thomas Gibbons.
Restating the law in this way would reform defamation law, clarifying and simplifying how
it and privacy law coexist, and could offer a useful path for addressing more technical
arguments about the boundaries between the actions or the ways in which they should be
reconciled.
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IN LAW, IT IS ALMOST INVARIABLY STATED that reputation is protected by

defamation. The point “is virtually axiomatic in the cases and the literature.”1
Libel and slander are “the torts which protect a person’s reputation.”2 Here I
suggest that such a statement is incorrect or, at least, that it can be misleading.
It is not reputation but aspects of reputation that are protected by defamation
law. That is all defamation law has ever protected. In the past, many common
law jurisdictions have offered little other protection to reputation, so it has
been practical to state that defamation is the law which seeks to reconcile the
protection of reputation and free speech. As the Law Commission of Ontario
notes in its 2017 consultation paper on defamation, “[h]istorically, reputation
was exclusively protected by the law of defamation and the law did not recognize
a right to privacy.”3 However, it is not reputation as some complete interest or
right that is protected by defamation law, but only aspects of it. Now reputation
can also be protected by privacy law, particularly informational privacy law. Such
law protects aspects of reputation even if they do not necessarily coincide with

1.
2.

3.

Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) at 1.
Richard Parkes & Alastair Mullis, eds, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th ed (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 4. In this article I use the collective descriptor “defamation” for
the actions that, in a minority of Canadian provinces, still exist as libel and slander. The
distinction remains in Ontario, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan legislation. See e.g.
Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L 12. In many comparable jurisdictions, any distinction
between libel and slander has been abolished. The distinction is not of great significance
for my purposes.
Law Commission of Ontario, Defamation Law in the Internet Age: Consultation Paper
(Toronto: November 2017) at 92 [LCO].
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those addressed by defamation law.4 This is not to suggest that all of privacy law is
relevant to defamation; clearly it is not. Privacy in the form of protection against
intrusion, for example, would be generally quite separate from reputational
interests. Rather, the point is that where material is published, it may give rise
to privacy claims that relate to aspects of reputation. Without considering here
the myriad forms of privacy action that exist in relevant jurisdictions, the forms
of privacy with which I am concerned can usefully be labelled informational
privacy. Breaching informational privacy, much more than breaching personal
or territorial privacy, can “involve some form of disclosure or publication
… that, most closely, resemble the kinds of values and interests engaged in
defamation law.”5
Recognizing this fact leads to the suggestion that exactly what each action
seeks to protect could be stated more concisely. Doing so would reform the
law in a manner that appears logical given the development of privacy law.
It would clarify and simplify how defamation and informational privacy law
coexist, without becoming focused on technical arguments about the boundaries
between the actions or the ways in which they can or should be reconciled.6 The
simplicity of the approach appeals as a way of thinking about the actions and
assessing how those technical arguments should be addressed. In Canada, where
such questions are relatively open,7 the approach should be examined closely and,
4.

5.
6.

7.

The point could be taken further, for example considering how data protection regulation
can protect aspects of reputation rather than privacy actions based in case law or statute. For
instance, see David Erdos, “Data Protection and the Right to Reputation: Filling the ‘Gaps’
After the Defamation Act 2013” (2014) 73 Cambridge LJ 536.
LCO, supra note 3 at 18.
Useful analyses of a more technical style exist in the literature. See e.g. Eric Barendt, “An
Overlap of Defamation and Privacy?” (2015) 7 J Media L 85; Ursula Cheer, “Diving the
Dignity Torts: A Possible Future for Defamation and Privacy” in Andrew T Kenyon, ed,
Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016)
309 [Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation]; David Rolph, “The Interaction Between
Defamation and Privacy” in Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham, eds, Private
Law in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart, 2017) 463.
I describe the questions as “relatively open” in part because of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. While I leave aside detailed consideration of the
Charter’s implications, I note two points. First, consideration of the European Convention
of Human Rights does not suggest notable barriers to this article’s argument; see Part IV.
Second, in relation to Canadian defamation law and the Charter, Hill v Scientology deserves
careful reconsideration. See Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 [Hill
v Scientology]. This case recognized the Charter’s relevance to defamation law, but contains
much reasoning that now reads as archaic. I make brief comments about it below in Part VI.
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I would suggest, favourably in any defamation law reform. With the development
of privacy law that offers “some protection to reputation,” the Law Commission
asks, “where does this leave the law of defamation?”8 My response is to suggest
that the basis of each action should be clarified, which would help to simplify the
relationship substantially. The ideas build on existing legal commentary, perhaps
most directly on work by Thomas Gibbons, who argued over twenty years ago
for the basis of liability in defamation law to be reconsidered.9 He was writing
before English law offered protection for privacy in relation to publications.
In the current context, where such protection exists, I would take something
like Gibbons’s recommendation for defamation law and add to it a similar point
about privacy. That would provide a better basis for defamation and privacy law
“in the Internet age.”10

I. COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Also relevant in the context of the Law Commission’s inquiry into defamation
law in the internet age is the detailed understanding of defamation law in practice
seen in wider research. In my assessment, much of that research leads to a similar
position to Gibbons’ on this issue. There is a large field of empirical research
into defamation law and practice, which began with US law before many

8. LCO, supra note 3 at 92.
9. Thomas Gibbons, “Defamation Reconsidered” (1996) 16 Oxford J Leg Stud 587.
10. LCO, supra note 3.
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other countries,11 and now extends to Canada.12 My own work forms a strand
within that field, focused on comparative defamation law, litigation, and news
production. It has included perhaps two hundred interviews with journalists,
lawyers, and judges about litigation practice and news production in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Australia.13 It has also involved analysis of media
content relevant to defamation law in various jurisdictions,14 as well as more
traditional doctrinal research into defamation law, cases, or legislative reform,
and some comparative doctrinal research on privacy law.
The empirical research in particular has given me a somewhat skeptical
view of defamation law’s stated aims and what it appears to achieve in practice.
In short, I doubt that defamation law does a passable job in terms of either
reputation or speech. There are longstanding concerns about defamation
law’s complexity, litigation costs, predictability, and effects on public debate,

11. See Marc A Franklin, “Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study” (1981) 6 Am Bar Found
Research J 795; Marc A Franklin, “A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel
Law” (1986) 74 Cal L Rev 809; Randall P Bezanson, “The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What
Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get” (1986) 74 Cal L Rev 789; Randall P Bezanson,
Gilbert Cranberg & John Soloski, Libel Law and the Press: Myth and Reality (New York: Free
Press, 1987); Randall P Bezanson, “The Libel Tort Today” (1988) 45 Wash & Lee L Rev
535; Rodney A Smolla & Michael J Gaertner, “The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The
Case for Enactment” (1989) 31 Wm & Mary L Rev 25; Michael Newcity, “The Sociology of
Defamation in Australia and the United States” (1991) 26 Tex Intl LJ 1; Brendan Edgeworth
& Michael Newcity, “Politicians, Defamation Law and the ‘Public Figure’ Defence” (1992)
10 L in Context 39; John Soloski & Randall P Bezanson, eds, Reforming Libel Law (New
York: Guilford Press, 1992); Brian C Murchison et al, “Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence
of Judicial Standards of Journalism” (1994) 73 NC L Rev 7; Eric Barendt et al, Libel and
the Media: The Chilling Effect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Ursula Cheer, “Myths and
Realities about the Chilling Effect: The New Zealand Media’s Experience of Defamation
Law” (2005) 13 Torts LJ 259; Roy Baker, Defamation Law and Social Attitudes: Ordinary
Unreasonable People (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011).
12. Hilary Young, “The Canadian Defamation Action: An Empirical Study” (2017)
Can Bar Rev 591.
13. See e.g. Andrew T Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (Abingdon: UCL
Press, 2006) [Kenyon, Comparative Law].
14. See e.g. Chris Dent & Andrew T Kenyon, “Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A Comparative
Content Analysis of Australian and US Newspapers” (2004) 9 Media & Arts L Rev 89;
Andrew T Kenyon, “Investigating Chilling Effects: News Media and Public Speech in
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia” (2010) 4 Intl J Comm 440.
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concerns which have continuing weight.15 Substantial reform to defamation
law is warranted, or at least its close and careful consideration is needed. As has
been observed of Canadian law, common law rules on a publication’s falsity,
the publisher’s fault, and resulting harm all deserve re-examination.16 There
are strong arguments that the plaintiff should have to prove, in some form, all
three of falsity, fault, and harm. Despite such longstanding concerns, law reform
efforts across many decades in commonwealth countries tend to have been
evolutionary more than they have been dramatic. This underlines an important
aspect of the Law Commission’s current work. It has canvased a wide range of
issues, including general and substantial change to the law. Within that context
of possible substantial reform, I focus on a relatively simple point; namely, how
the protection of reputation connects with defamation and privacy law. This
leads to a suggestion for what I would call a reform of clarification. This reform
would restate the basis of liability in a defamation action seeking damages and
the basis of liability in privacy actions responding to publications. The argument
leaves open many other possible reforms, including, for example, the value of a
response analogous to a right of reply for online publications that harm aspects
of reputation. Such a response could lessen the focus on damages and recognize
the value in discursive remedies, both suggestions which have been called for in
the wider literature.17 But I suggest that an online focus alone is insufficient, and
that wider reform is warranted.

II. THINKING ABOUT DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY
In the recent edited collection, Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law,18
I began with the statement that defamation and privacy “are now two central
issues in media law.”19 But that does not mean the actions should cause great

15. See e.g. United Kingdom, Report of the Committee of the Law of Defamation, (HMSO 1948);
United Kingdom, Report of the Committee on Defamation (HMSO 1975); England and
Wales, Supreme Court Procedure Committee, Report on Practice and Procedure in Defamation
(London: 1991); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation, Report 75
(Sydney: NSWLRC 1995). In the US context, see Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 11 at 31.
16. See e.g. Daniel W Burnett, “The New Face of Defamation” in Todd L Archibald, Annual
Review of Civil Litigation 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) 409.
17. See e.g. Alistair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously and
Where It Leads” (2012) 63 N Ir Leg Q 3; “Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013”
(2014) 77 Mod L Rev 87 at 107-108.
18. Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation, supra note 6.
19. Andrew T Kenyon, “Defamation and Privacy in an Era of ‘More Speech.’” Ibid, 1 at 1.
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challenges for each other or should, for example, be merged.20 Rather, I noted
that defamation and privacy law had not often been addressed together in detail
in the past. Issues of privacy were absent (or were only briefly considered) in
books on journalism and law, for example.21 That has gradually changed.22
Similarly, twentieth-century law reform reports on defamation often left privacy
aside. One that did not, which I will come back to, is the Australian Law Reform
Commission’s 1979 report Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy.23 Beyond
that historical instance, in the last ten years or so (and for slightly longer in leading
media law chambers of barristers in London) there has been more thought about
the overlaps or connections between defamation and privacy actions.
Increased concerns about rights, changed communications technologies,
and greater awareness of comparative law have all influenced moves towards
greater privacy protection within media law. In the common law world, this
is particularly true for Commonwealth jurisdictions; US privacy law is more
longstanding but less significant for media publications.24 Privacy is perhaps still
understood more as a private law tort action which is effectively overruled by
the public First Amendment’s protection of free speech, than as a human rights
action, the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and
seizure notwithstanding.25 As well as being relevant to raising concerns about
privacy, these changes connected to rights, technology, and comparative law

20. Cf Cheer, supra note 6.
21. For example, in the Australian context, there was no direct consideration of privacy or
confidential information in the classic text of Geoffrey Sawer. A Guide to Australian Law for
Journalists, Authors, Printers and Publishers (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1949).
22. See e.g. Mark Pearson, The Journalist’s Guide to Media Law (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin,
1997). For subsequent editions, see Mark Pearson & Mark Polden, The Journalist’s Guide
to Media Law, 4th ed (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2011). A similar pattern can be seen
in New Zealand’s leading media law text by John F Burrows, with a gradual emergence
of privacy as a distinct and detailed topic for examination and a brief mention of lack of
clear legal avenues to protect privacy in relation to the media. See News Media Law in New
Zealand (Wellington: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974) at 337. For a complete chapter on privacy, see
the work of John Burrows and Ursula Cheer. Media Law in New Zealand, 4th ed (Auckland:
Oxford University Press, 1999) at 171-98. See also Ursula Cheer, Burrows and Cheer Media
Law in New Zealand, 7th ed (Wellington: LexisNexis NZ, 2015).
23. Austl Commonwealth, Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation
and Privacy (Report 11) (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1979).
24. But see Amy Gajda, “The Trouble with Dignity” in Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation,
supra note 6 at 246.
25. See e.g. Kirsty Hughes & Neil M Richards, “The Atlantic Divide on Privacy and Free Speech”
in Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation, supra note 6, 164 at 164.
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have also prompted defamation law reform and increased protection of speech.
In many ways, the evolution of both actions has run in parallel.
My point on these changes is simple. While there are ways in which the
concepts overlap and some conduct can give rise to actions in both defamation
and privacy, this should be much less of a concern than is sometimes suggested.
Both actions involve personality interests, but they do not have the same aims.
The defence of truth (or the requirement for plaintiffs to prove falsity where
that applies26) marks an important limit to what defamation is said to protect.
Common law defamation law does not aim to protect a reputation that has been
“wrongly” won, such as a reputation based on false facts. That is an aspect of
reputation that lies beyond English and almost all commonwealth defamation
law.27 It is not that such a publication causes no harm; rather, the harm caused
is not wrongful in terms of defamation law.28 If a publication is true, reputation
is merely reduced to its “proper level.”29 For present purposes, this is more
relevant than the various ways in which reputation has been analysed in the legal
literature.30 Defamation should only involve falsehood, as suggested by “its very
definition.”31 Under current law, defamatory facts that can be proven true—which
might well include private facts—do not create liability under defamation law.32
Nor should they do so. Similarly, defamatory privileged facts that have not been
26. Kenyon discusses this phenomenon in particular regarding both public and private plaintiffs
under US law. Kenyon, Comparative Law, supra note 13 at 241-46.
27. Descheemaeker has undertaken a close, historically focused examination of the truth defence
in defamation, analyzing arguments that defamation law should or should not require public
benefit to be shown as well as truth. He prefers the “truth alone” position, which I adopt
here. See Eric Descheemaeker, “‘Veritas non est defamatio’? Truth as a Defence in the Law of
Defamation” (2011) 31 LS 1.
28. Leto Cariolou observes that “what strikes one as unfair in certain interferences with
reputation is when these produce ‘wrongful’ harm as opposed to any harm.” See
“Circumnavigating the Conflict Between the Right to Reputation and the Right to Freedom
of Expression” in Stijn Smet & Eva Brems, eds, When Human Rights Clash at the European
Court of Human Rights: Conflict or Harmony? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)
171 at 171, 176.
29. See e.g. Rofe v Smith’s Newspapers (1924), 25 SR (NSW) 4 at 21-22 (Street ACJ).
30. See e.g. Robert C Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution” (1986) 74 Cal L Rev 691; McNamara, supra note 1; David Rolph, Reputation,
Celebrity and Defamation Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
31. Descheemaeker, supra note 27 at 14.
32. To avoid misunderstanding, it may be worth stating directly that I use the word “defamatory”
in the sense of meeting the relevant legal test for defamatory meaning (such as lowering
someone in the estimation of ordinary people). Elsewhere, “defamatory” is sometimes used as
shorthand for a publication that is actionable under defamation law (where the plaintiff’s case
is made out and no defence applies). That usage, however, can be confusing.
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proven true are often protected by defamation law, as they should be. But that
need not mean that law fails to protect interests in privacy, just that defamation
law does not do so. Such interests can be addressed under privacy law (or allied
breach of confidence actions).33
Here, I address four matters related to the idea that defamation protects only
aspects of reputation. First, the historical approach in a minority of Australian
jurisdictions is examined where the justification defence required public
interest or public benefit to be proven as well as truth. Second, the treatment
of reputation under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is
considered. Third, the focus on reputation and privacy of Canada’s Office of
the Privacy Commissioner is noted. Fourth, I ask how matters might be taken
further through more precisely specifying what defamation and informational
privacy should protect.34

III. MORE THAN TRUTH? SOME FORMER AUSTRALIAN LAW
Australia gained largely uniform defamation laws in 2006.35 Previously, each state
and territory had its own defamation law. The former laws could be grouped
into a largely common law model followed by most jurisdictions, the “Code”
jurisdictions of Queensland and Tasmania, which had substantially codified
defamation laws dating from the nineteenth century,36 and the law of the most
33. See e.g. Megan Richardson et al, Breach of Confidence: Social Origins and Modern
Developments (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
34. Civil law approaches to defamation liability could also be considered, but differences in
practice under civilian approaches—as just one aspect, think of legal costs that are far lower
and more predictable—mean the overall effects on speech appear to be markedly different,
and probably lesser than those of traditional commonwealth defamation. An obvious
caveat could be the way that criminal sanctions still apply more often under civilian
defamation. But the differences in speed, costs, and (I suspect) predictability are striking.
Comparisons could be made with the longstanding and strong criticisms of the complexity
of commonwealth defamation law, the expense of litigation, the lack of predictability of
disputes, and the effects of the law on public debate. See generally supra note 15.
35. See e.g. Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), No 77. The Acts are collectively referred to as
“Uniform Defamation Acts” or “Uniform Defamation Laws.” Legislation in each of the states
commenced on 1 January 2006, in the Australian Capital Territory on 23 February 2006,
and in the Northern Territory on 26 April 2006.
36. See e.g. Defamation Act 1889 (Qld). Western Australia also had a code, but it had limited
application to civil defamation. See West Australian Newspapers v Bridge (1979), 141 CLR
535. For more detail on the codes, see Andrew T Kenyon & Sophie Walker, “The Cost of
Losing the Code: Historical Protection of Public Debate in Australian Defamation Law”
(2014) 38 Melbourne UL Rev 554.
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populous state of New South Wales (“NSW”). NSW had used the Code for more
than a decade,37 until it adopted a statutory model under its Defamation Act
1974, which had some marked differences from the common law.38
For present purposes, it is worth noting that the former law in NSW, the
Australian Capital Territory, and the Code jurisdictions required more than truth
in the justification defence. The law required proof of substantial truth and that
publication was for the public benefit (or in NSW, that it was published in relation
to a matter of public interest or on an occasion of qualified privilege).39 Similar
“truth plus public benefit” versions of the defence exist in some other common
law jurisdictions internationally, but for present purposes the Australian example
is sufficient.40 It has long been suggested that this sort of additional element
should be required. In the 1840s, a Select Committee of the UK House of Lords
proposed a “public benefit” requirement for justification in both criminal and
civil libel. The change was made for criminal law, but not for civil defamation
in England.41 NSW adopted the suggestion for civil defamation in 1847;42
it appears the change was made to protect the reputation of former convicts.43
(Another version of this concern exists in English law under the Rehabilitation
of Offenders Act 1974, which disallows justification defences in relation to
publishing a “spent” conviction where publication occurs with malice.44) The
Code jurisdictions also required the publisher to show public benefit. Victoria
repealed the requirement in the mid-1800s when it separated from what was then
the colony of NSW. Elsewhere in Australia, truth was always the only element of
the justification defence.
Although this difference between Australian defamation laws existed for
more than 150 years, there was virtually no case law on the public interest or

37. Defamation Act, 1958 (NSW), No 39.
38. See e.g. Andrew T Kenyon, “Imputation or Publication: The Cause of Action in Defamation
Law” (2004) 27 UNSWLJ 100 and “Perfecting Polly Peck: Defences of Truth and Opinion in
Australian Defamation Law and Practice” (2007) 29 Sydney L Rev 651.
39. See e.g. Defamation Act, 1889 (Qld), supra note 36, s 15; Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 15.
40. For a wider review, also considering civil law traditions, see Descheemaeker, supra note 27.
41. Libel Act, 1843 (UK), 6 & 7 Vict, c 96, s 6. This reform was a liberalization, as previously
truth had offered no defence to criminal defamation.
42. Defamation Act, 1847 (UK), 11 Vict No 13, s 4 (sometimes referred to as the Injuries to
Character Act).
43. See e.g. Austl, NSW, Law Reform Commission, Report of the Law Reform Commission on
Defamation, (Report 11) (Sydney: Government Printer, 1971) at 64.
44. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (UK), c 53, s 8. See also Descheemaeker, supra
note 27 at 7-9.
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public benefit element of the defence.45 It was not a hurdle that posed difficulties
in disputes reaching court. While peripheral in litigation, it perhaps affected
pre-publication decisions more. In any event, it was abandoned in Australia’s
uniform defamation laws. The change can be understood as better separating
ideas of defamation and privacy (even if privacy protection related to publication
still awaits substantial development in Australia).46 Overall, the connections of
reputation and privacy suggested by Australian history do not appear significant
for possible Canadian reforms.

IV. ARTICLES 8 AND 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
There is more to note about debates over Articles 8 and 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the idea that reputation comes within Article
8 of the Convention. This is something that is raised but not analysed in the Law
Commission of Ontario’s project to date.47 European case law examines how
reputation is, in some way, part of the “private and family life” that is protected
under Article 8. It might be thought to mean that any claim in defamation raises
full Article 8 issues, but that would be an error. Article 8 provides that everyone
has “the right to respect for … private and family life,” which a public authority
cannot interfere with “except as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society … for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Defamation and privacy are intertwined in Article 8, but in some
circumstances only. An initial point is that the scope of Article 8 is wider than
what would often be labelled “privacy.” The provision can well be described as
“open and dynamic” in its coverage.48 Private life is “a broad term, not susceptible
to exhaustive definition,” which protects “much more than a straightforward
45. But see e.g. Chappell v TCN Channel Nine (1988), 14 NSWLR 153.
46. Megan Richardson, Marcia Neave, and Michael Rivette offer a recent review of this
phenomenon in the Australian context. See “Invasion of Privacy and Recovery for Distress”
in Jason NE Varuhas & Nicole Moreham, eds, Remedies for Breach of Privacy (Oxford:
Hart, 2018) 165.
47. See LCO, supra note 3; David Mangan, The Relationship Between Defamation, Breach
of Privacy and Other Legal Claims Involving Offensive Internet Content (Toronto: Law
Commission of Ontario, July 2017).
48. See e.g. Dirk Voorhoof, “Freedom of Expression versus Privacy and the Right to Reputation:
How to Preserve Public Interest Journalism” in Stijn Smet & Eva Brems, eds, When Human
Rights Clash at the European Court of Human Rights: Conflict or Harmony? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017) 148 at 154.
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right to privacy.”49 One implication is that privacy law elsewhere need not have
the same compass.
Beyond the breadth of Article 8, what do the cases suggest about defamation,
privacy, and reputation? For my purposes, useful points about the decisions
emerge from work of Tanya Aplin and Jason Bosland.50 They examine theoretical
rationales for a connection between reputation and privacy and seek to explain
the Strasbourg court’s Article 8 case law. They aim for an analysis consistent
with the cases, but also consistent with their preferred theoretical rationales to
understanding reputation and private life. At a general level, I think their points
are helpful here, even if Canada can and should adopt a somewhat simpler version
of the ideas that emerge from the European Convention.
There are three points to take from the analysis. First, the European Article
8 case law is somewhat inconsistent and confusing (which analyses of reputation
and privacy can easily become). Even so, there is an overall trend in the cases,
with greater structure emerging in reconciling privacy and freedom of expression,
and relative clarity about when harm to reputation in a defamation claim does
have relevance under Article 8.51 Second, “Strasbourg has held that reputation
and private life are conceptually distinct interests: it is the external evaluation
of a person which makes up their reputation and, therefore, reputation per
se is not related to private life.”52 That is worth emphasizing: The connection
between reputation and private life is not ubiquitous; it only arises in some
circumstances. Third, as to those circumstances, Aplin and Bosland argue the
best interpretation of the cases is that “reputation does not form part of private life
but that harm to reputation might cause harm to private life.”53 It arises in cases of
serious reputational harm of a form that means there is harm to private life. They
argue that, more than the seriousness of harm as such, it is the quality or type of
serious harm that should be decisive. The protection of private life is engaged,
for example, when the harm relates to the formation of relationships connected
with private life.54 Thus, the European case law needs to be treated with some
care, and the connections between reputation and privacy arise in only some

49. Cariolou, supra note 28 at 174.
50. “The Uncertain Landscape of Article 8 of the ECHR: The Protection of Reputation
as a Fundamental Human Right?” in Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation, supra
note 6, 265 at 265.
51. See also Voorhoof, supra note 48; Cariolou, supra note 28.
52. Aplin & Bosland, supra note 50 at 266.
53. Ibid at 267 [emphasis in original].
54. Ibid at 290.
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circumstances, namely where harm to reputation is of a kind and seriousness that
leads to harm to private life.
In part, my use of Aplin and Bosland is negative: They clearly demonstrate
why reputation should not be thought to engage Article 8 automatically. But
further, the types of serious harm that they examine—in particular, harm
connected with interests in sociality—are useful to keep in mind in thinking
about defamation, privacy, and reputation. Defamation has long been called the
sociological tort,55 but this approach suggests it is not the only one. The point is
that reputation is inherently social and that legal actions which seek to protect
aspects of reputation will have that sociological quality.
Below, I suggest how the division of defamation and privacy can be taken
further, or at least stated more clearly, than the European cases have done to date.
This sort of clarification is important when defamation and privacy are more and
more frequently raised together. The tendency has been well-recognized in the
European context with, for example, Dirk Voorhoof suggesting multiple reasons
why more conflicts are now understood to arise between Articles 8 and 10 of the
European Convention.56 Reasons include an expanded sphere for public discourse
via both traditional and social media; public and private spheres converging in
some ways; individuals sharing more of their private lives online; digital tracking
and surveillance, as well as wider data practices, making personal information
more accessible to others; and the European Court’s expanded interpretations
of both Articles.
Indeed, misuse of private information may well become a primary way
in which ordinary people think about harm to reputation. In a small-scale
study, Jane Bailey and Valarie Steeves suggest that young Canadians view legal
protections of privacy as a critical aspect of reputational protection.57 They note
that “[p]articipants interwove privacy concerns throughout [the] interviews
about online reputation and reputational harm,”58 and conclude that “legal
privacy protections are intimately connected to reputation creation, maintenance
and protection.”59 They also recognize that defamation law’s limits in relation to
material that is proven true (and its concern with individual rather than group
or collective reputation) make it less suited to addressing these concerns. But
55. See e.g. Jerome H Skolnick, “Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation” (1986)
74 Cal L Rev 677.
56. Supra note 48 at 150-56.
57. Defamation Law in the Age of the Internet: Young People’s Perspectives (Toronto: Law
Commission of Ontario, June 2017) at 8.
58. Ibid at 7.
59. Ibid at 5.
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the interesting point is that, at least for informational privacy, the view of these
young respondents had parallels with the 2018 comments of a first-instance
English judge who stated, “[i]t is … quite plain that the protection of reputation
is part of the function of the law of privacy as well as the function of the law of
defamation. That is entirely rational.”60

V. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER AND ONLINE
REPUTATION
A combination of reputation and privacy concerns can also be seen in Canada’s
Office of the Privacy Commissioner (“OPC”) in its 2018 draft policy position
on online reputation.61 Factors noted by Voorhoof—a changed sphere for public
discourse, a partial convergence of public and private spheres, individuals sharing
personal information, and so forth—mean that thinking about reputation online
necessarily means thinking about privacy. At a general level, the OPC favours a
public interest test for whether personal information should be available online.
It is concerned with issues such as de-indexing and the accuracy, completeness,
and currency of information online,62 much of which is clearly connected to
privacy and the role of public interest within privacy law. It considers possible
informal responses (rather than formal legal actions). This is a significant issue
in the context of high-volume and low economic value claims about internet
content, and relevant to wider defamation reform. Importantly, the OPC notes
debates about private sector entities balancing rights to privacy and speech,
which might well arise in informal dispute mechanisms. In general, I would
agree with criticisms of private sector balancing as a final measure. At the least,
some form of accessible public law oversight mechanism would be important.
(To say, as the OPC does, that private sector balancing already happens does
not make it appropriate without some form of public oversight.) All that lends
weight to a simple, quick, cheap public approach to online reputational concerns
where possible. Of course, simple, quick, and cheap responses to reputational
harm have been sought for decades. Almost every defamation law reform effort
60. Richard v BBC, [2018] EWHC 1837 at para 345 (Ch) (Mann J).
61. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation”
(26 January 2018), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/
consultation-on-online-reputation/pos_or_201801> [perma.cc/9XAP-4C88].
62. The OPC considers this specifically in the context of existing Canadian law under the
federal privacy law for the private sector. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5.
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in the common law world during the twentieth century paid attention to these
concerns. The challenge is devising an approach that meets such aims. The need
is perhaps even more evident under contemporary conditions of public speech.
As Emily Laidlaw has emphasized:
[M]ost online defamation claims are high-volume and low-value. … [T]here is a
high volume of defamation online, but most claims are not worth litigating given
low potential damages and legal complexity involved. The end result is that for most
wronged there is little opportunity for redress.63

My sense is that stating more concisely just what is sought to be protected
by defamation and privacy law could be a useful step in addressing the need for
more accessible responses overall.

VI. RESTATING AND REFORMING DEFAMATION:
EVALUATION BASED ON FALSE AND DEFAMATORY
FACTS
There is another way to explain my general point that defamation and privacy
law are largely separate, even though both connect with reputational concerns.
That is to return to the Australian Law Reform Commission report from 1979.64
Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy dealt with harmful publication in
terms of private facts and defamation, but it did not merge them. They remained
two distinct actions, with particular thought given to how they could benefit
from similar or complementary procedure and a wider range of remedies.65 But
within or preceding such reforms, there is a basic question: Just what should
defamation aim to protect?
For that purpose, I want to outline something of Gibbons’s analysis in
the article “Defamation Reconsidered.”66 He focuses on the basis for liability
in defamation law and argues that “the underlying assumption, that reputation
63. Are We Asking Too Much from Defamation Law? Reputation Systems, ADR, Industry Regulation
and other Extra-Judicial Possibilities for Protecting Reputation in the Internet Age: Proposal for
Reform (Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, September 2017) at 19. See also JC Gibson,
“Adapting Defamation Law Reform to Online Publication” (2018) 22 Media & Arts L Rev
118. The author, Judge Judith Gibson, heads the defamation list in the District Court of
New South Wales.
64. Supra note 23.
65. A broadly similar structure is seen in Rowbottom’s useful recent analysis “Personal Rights:
Reputation and Privacy.” See Media Law (Oxford: Hart, 2018) ch 2 at 36-109.
66. Gibbons, supra note 9.
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should be protected, is unfounded.”67 Rather, he places reputation within a
broader interest in controlling personal information. (One could see links to
privacy here, something he might well have explored further if privacy was then
protected under English law as it is now.) The issue is understood through the
lens of information management: What role should law have in limiting or
supporting such management?
For Gibbons, law should not be concerned with reputation as such. A person
does not have a right as to how others evaluate him or her—that is, as to the
conclusion that they reach—nor should such a right exist. Rather, the legal
position should be that people are not evaluated on the basis of false facts. In other
words, I do not have any right as to what you think of my conduct or statements.
You can think what you like. But I do have an interest that your evaluation of me
not be based on false facts. As Gibbons states:
It is misleading … to speak of the law of defamation as vindicating a right to
reputation, where that suggests a special claim to particular conclusions about a
person’s status. Nevertheless, the individual does have a strong interest, if not in the
protection of a definitive evaluation of his or her social standing, in attempting to
control the elements that produce and modify it.68

This might be thought to resemble existing defamation law. It is not at all rare
to see statements that defamation law is all about false publications that would
make ordinary people think less of the plaintiff. The Law Commission’s current
inquiry offers examples; another comes from the historic Canadian decision Hill
v Scientology.69 The decision, now more than two decades old, appeared to be
somewhat outdated when it was delivered, let alone after substantial developments
in the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada on defamation.70 Even so,
much of it remains Canadian law.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Ibid at 614 [emphasis added].
Ibid at 593.
Supra note 7.
See e.g. WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson, 2008 SCC 40; Grant v Torstar, 2009 SCC 61. One of
the more interesting analyses of such developments and their implications for Canadian law
(but I would differ on how US law is dealt with there) is performed by Bob Tarantino in his
article. See Bob Tarantino, “Chasing Reputation: The Argument for Differential Treatment of
‘Public Figures’ in Canadian Defamation Law” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 595.
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For present purposes, I want to highlight one passage from Justice Cory, who
delivered the judgment of almost all the judges.71 When concluding that US-style
reforms to defamation law were not warranted in Canada, Justice Cory stated:
The law of defamation is essentially aimed at the prohibition of the publication of
injurious false statements. It is the means by which the individual may protect his
or her reputation which may well be the most distinguishing feature of his or her
character, personality and, perhaps, identity. I simply cannot see that the law of
defamation is unduly restrictive or inhibiting.72

The problem is that the first sentence is wrong or, at least, places far too
much weight on the word “aimed.” Falsity is presumed and harm is presumed in
traditional common law defamation. This means actionable statements may
well be neither false nor harmful to reputation in any quantified manner. (The
highlighted sentence is also surprising in suggesting that defamation law aims at
the “prohibition” of publication. Defamation does not prohibit publication, but
can make publishers liable after publication.) Perhaps defamation law has been
aimed at addressing false publications that harm reputation, but it has pursued
that aim in an unusual manner because of its presumptions.
The wording used by Justice Cory is absolutely routine. It is a habitual
shorthand, but it is a dangerous one which obscures a key peculiarity of
defamation law. If defamation law is aimed at false harmful publications, one
might well think it should be reformed. The statement might also be thought
ironic, given its position in the judgment’s rejection of US-style reforms. This
is because requiring almost all categories of plaintiff to prove falsity is one of
the significant changes made by the Sullivan rules to US defamation law.73 The
Sullivan rules highlight the fact that traditional common law does not require
proof of falsity.

71. Hill v Scientology, supra note 7. Justice Cory delivered the judgment of Justices La Forest,
Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, and Major. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé largely agreed in
a separate judgment.
72. Ibid at 1187 [emphasis added].
73. New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan]. I use the term “Sullivan rules”
following Michael Chesterman. See Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) at 155. The intention is to highlight that the US approach is not
a defence but a set of increased burdens placed on public figure (and some other) plaintiffs,
developed through the case of Sullivan and subsequent decisions. For an analysis of the rules
and US defamation litigation, see Kenyon, Comparative Law, supra note 13 at 239-80. The
rules have also been applied to media privacy cases. See e.g. Andrew T Kenyon & Megan
Richardson, “Reverberations of Sullivan? Considering Defamation and Privacy Law Reform”
in Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation, supra note 6, 331 at 331, 336-39.
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In relation to the burden of proof, Gibbons’s analysis suggests it should be
shifted with plaintiffs required to prove falsity. As noted above, Gibbons examines
what within the concept of reputation should be addressed by defamation law and
argues it is the evaluation of people on the basis of false facts. Thus, in an action
for damages the burden should be on the plaintiff—as it would normally be in
a tort action—to show the information is false. This would mean publishing
opinion or comment would not in itself create liability: “[T]he emphasis on
evidence of truth also suggests that statements of opinion should not be regarded
as parts of the foundation for social appraisal.”74
Gibbons is not alone in seeking to rethink how defamation law treats comment.
In the US context, Justice Powell famously stated in Gertz v Robert Welch:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
other ideas.75

This appears to create a complete protection for opinion, but in Milkovich v
Lorain Journal, the US Supreme Court re-expressed the requirement and held that
actionable defamation requires statements of fact capable of being proved false.76
In substance the strength of protection suggested by Gertz remains.77 What can
create liability under US law is false factual inferences conveyed by a publication
that otherwise conveys opinion. Gibbons’s approach would be similar. Notably,
in the Canadian context, Raymond Brown has also observed that opinions that
do not convey false facts should not be actionable in defamation. In his view, the
current defence is “fundamentally flawed.”78 While a critical review of a restaurant,
for example, might be thought to harm reputation, it could well be argued that
factually false material (if any is conveyed by the review) is what should form
the basis of an action for damages. There are separate questions as to whether
plaintiffs might continue to face lesser burdens when only seeking discursive
remedies and not damages (were such speech-based remedies to be developed).79
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Gibbons, supra note 9 at 607.
418 US 323, 339-40 (1974) [Gertz] [emphasis added].
497 US 1, 19-20 (1990).
See further Kenyon, Comparative Law, supra note 13 at 246-47.
Raymond E Brown, Defamation Law: A Primer, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 290-91,
493-94; The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 957, n 7.
There, Brown opines that “any comment, whether fair or not, or whether or not made on
matters of public interest, that does not otherwise imply the existence of undisclosed false
and defamatory facts should not be actionable.”
79. See e.g. Mullis & Scott, supra note 17.
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It is probably worth repeating that suggesting plaintiffs should be required
to prove falsity in an action for damages is not meant to imply that should be
the only change to their position. Plaintiffs might also be required to prove some
form of fault and harm, as is commonly the case in civil actions.80 Nor does the
suggestion imply that damages should be the central response of defamation law.
There are many valuable analyses calling for a reduction in the focus on damages
as a remedy.81 Second, a question remains as to whether existing common law
test(s) for what is defamatory should be reformulated, an issue which is widely
addressed in the literature.82 Third, the somewhat problematic treatment of
meaning within defamation law and practice is left aside here.83
Gibbons considers what type of redress would be appropriate for a law
interested in addressing evaluation based on false facts, suggesting that the
general shape of the remedy would be “a form of declaratory relief based on
the finding that an unsubstantiated allegation has been made.”84 This largely
non-judicial dispute handling process would be quite different from existing US
law, although comparisons could be made with some older reform suggestions
there.85 For my purposes, the more significant point is that defamation should
not seek to protect reputation as such. Rather, it should address evaluation based
on false facts. In line with Gibbons’s analysis, I would suggest there is an interest
in protecting that aspect of reputation.

VII. REPUTATION AND INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY:
EVALUATION BASED ON PRIVATE FACTS
With the development of privacy law related to publication, the analysis could
be taken further. I am thinking primarily of developments in English law, but

80. See Archibald, supra note 16.
81. See John G Fleming’s “Retraction and Reply” for a classic example. “Retraction and Reply:
Alternative Remedies for Defamation” (1978) 12 UBC L Rev 15.
82. See e.g. Eric Barendt, “What Is the Point of Libel Law?” (1999) 52 Current Leg Probs 110;
McNamara, supra note 1.
83. See e.g. Kenyon, Comparative Law, supra note 13; Andrew Scott, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe: The
Autopoietic Inanity of the Single Meaning Rule” in Kenyon, ed, Comparative Defamation,
supra note 6, 40 at 40.
84. Gibbons, supra note 9 at 613.
85. See e.g. The Iowa Libel Project and its proposal for a voluntary Libel Dispute Resolution
Program, which would determine issues of truth or falsity and reputational harm. Roselle
L Wissler et al, “Resolving Libel Out of Court: The Libel Dispute Resolution Program” in
Soloski & Bezanson, supra note 11 at 286.
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some Canadian law raises similar points.86 The details on the different approaches
and, for example, variation between provinces are not important for my purposes
here. At the least, one would understand that privacy is not always implicated
when questions of defamation arise and that something like the form of serious
harm to private life need under the European Convention of Human Rights for
defamation claims to engage Article 8 should be required.
But one could go further. Defamation should be understood to concern
an interest in not being evaluated based on false facts, while privacy should
be understood as an interest in not being evaluated based on private facts.
To express the point so succinctly might be misleading. Defamation should be
concerned with false facts that meet a suitable test of what is defamatory and are
not protected by other defences such as qualified or absolute privilege. Privacy
should concern private facts that were not published in the public interest (or
where another defence applies). Each action should be concerned with false or
private information, the publication of which is “wrongful.” But the core idea of
evaluation based on false facts or private facts suggests clearly how defamation
and privacy actions can coexist, with each relating to aspects of reputation.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

I began this article with the point that libel and slander are commonly said to be
“the torts which protect a person’s reputation,” quoting a standard commonwealth
reference Gatley on Libel and Slander.87 In fact, there has been a subtle change in
this text. Older versions began with their very first paragraph making exactly
that point: The subject matter of the book is defamation law which protects
reputation.88 The twelfth edition has a different initial paragraph, focused on
“reputation and defamation.” It is the second paragraph that has the same simple
statement about defamation law protecting reputation, but with slightly different
wording: “The laws of libel and slander provide the primary legal means for defending
reputation, and responding to unwarranted and damaging allegations.”89
The use of “primary” in that extract is notable. As privacy law has developed,
it has become clearer that defamation is not the only legal action that could be
thought to protect reputation. Both defamation and privacy, among other possible
86. See e.g. LCO, supra note 3 at 92-95.
87. Parkes & Mullis, supra note 2 at 4.
88. See e.g. Patrick Milmo & WVH Rogers, eds, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 10th ed (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at 3; 11th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) at 3.
89. Parkes & Mullis, supra note 2 at 3 [emphasis added].
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actions, can now claim to protect aspects of reputation. In terms of actions for
damages, they should be understood to do so in two distinct ways. With the
additional requirements (such as the test for defamatory meaning in defamation
claims, or the absence of public interest in relation to privacy claims) and other
caveats noted above, the position should be that defamation addresses evaluation
based on false facts, and privacy claims related to publication address evaluation
based on private facts. Whether larger or smaller reforms are made to defamation
law as a whole, clarifying the relationship of defamation law with “reputation”
and “privacy” would be a valuable result for any Canadian developments.

